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ABSTRACT 
 
In November 2006 General Motors sold 51% ownership of its subsidiary, the General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation to Cerebus Capital Management in a complicated transaction. This 
paper demonstrates that GMAC produced over 90% of consolidated General Motors profit over 
the past two decades and tries to determine why the GM team sought to sell its best player and 
answer the natural follow-up question: why sell 51% of GMAC, instead of all of it? A number of 
possible explanations are considered, including cleaning up GM’s balance sheet, unlocking the 
submerged market value of GMAC, and improving GMAC’s credit rating/ access to capital. The 
paper concludes that the partial divestiture was a sound move that could easily have resulted in 
better financial performance for GM than the status quo, but that the entire strategy was upset by 
the subprime loan crisis of 2007-08. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n November 30, 2006 when General Motors completed the sale of 51% ownership of General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) to Cerberus Capital Management, the same private equity fund that 
had recently purchased 80% of Chrysler Corporation. While the $14 billion sale price improved GM’s 
chances of being able to fund its latest reorganization efforts, the intriguing question remains: Could GM actually be 
better off by owning only 49% of GMAC rather than owning all of it or none of it?   
 
GMAC 
 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation was established in 1919 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of General 
Motors to provide GM dealers with financing for their auto inventories and retail buyers with a convenient form of 
credit for new auto purchases. Twenty years later GMAC began to diversify its operations by selling insurance to its 
retail customers, and by 1985 had entered the mortgage business, eventually forming the GMAC Commercial 
Mortgage Corporation (GMACCM) and the Residential Capital Corporation (ResCap). (In early 2006 GMAC sold 
78% of GMACCM to Capmark Financial.) While many people think of GMAC as primarily an auto financing 
business, the ResCap operation generated over $189 billion of new mortgage loans in 2006, making it the 7
th
 largest 
originator of residential mortgage loans in the United States. Although approximately 80% of these loans were later 
packaged and resold in the mortgage-backed securities market, by 2006 ResCap was servicing $412 billion of 
mortgages and retained ownership of $69 billion in  mortgage loans, or almost 40% of GMAC’s receivables. 
 
 While General Motors was generating most of the headlines, GMAC was producing most of the profits. In 
the 1989-2006 period GM earned a total of $30.1 billion, but as Table 1 shows, 93% of the consolidated net income 
was produced by GMAC’s lending operations. 
 
As Figure 1 demonstrates, GMAC’s profit was also very consistent and predictable, which served to 
dampen the normal cyclical swings in GM’s automaking results: 
 
O 
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Table 1:  GM and GMAC Profit (1989-2006) 
Year GMAC Segment Profit (In Billions) GM Consolidated Profit (In Billions) 
1989 $ 1.111 $ 4.224 
1990 1.190 (1.986) 
1991 1.038 (4.992) 
1992 1.218 (2.621) 
1993 .981 2.466 
1994 .920 4.901 
1995 1.031 6.881 
1996 1.240 4.963 
1997 1.301 6.698 
1998 1.325 2.956 
1999 1.527 6.002 
2000 1.602 4.452 
2001 1.786 .601 
2002 2.203 1.735 
2003 2.506 3.525 
2004 2.894 2.701 
2005 2.282 (10.417) 
2006 2.125 (1.978) 
TOTAL $ 28.280 $ 30.111 
 
 
Figure 1:  GMAC Profit vs. GM Profit 
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THE PARTIAL SALE OF GMAC 
 
Despite the consistently strong financial performance of its financing subsidiary, in early 2003 General 
Motors began to seriously explore the sale of all or part of GMAC. With the financial press questioning the 
underlying reasons for such a transaction and speculating about the potential proceeds involved, the deal was on-
again, off-again for three years. Finally, in early 2006 Cerberus Capital Management emerged as the leading bidder, 
and in April of that year GM announced that it would sell 51% of GMAC to Cerberus in a complicated transaction 
valued at just over $14 billion. At the November 30, 2006 deal closing, Cerberus paid $7.4 billion in cash for its 
stake, as well as allowing GMAC to give GM a dividend of $2.7 billion in cash and $4.1 billion in auto assets under 
lease just before the change in control took place, thus raising the total value of the deal to the announced $14 
billion.  Four months later GM agreed to refund $1 billion of the purchase price as a retroactive adjustment to reflect 
the rapidly deteriorating loan portfolio at GMAC’s ResCap unit. 
  
REASONS FOR THE SALE 
 
Normally corporations sell assets because they need to raise cash or they are unable to turn around an 
underperforming business. However, in this case it appears that neither of these reasons was the underlying 
motivation for the sale. Although its subprime loan problems were later to be problematic, at the time of the sale 
GMAC was a stellar performer with strong growth prospects and no serious weaknesses.  From 2002 to 2006 its 
interest revenue grew an average of 10% per year, and the company was just beginning to tap significant new loan 
markets in China. Additionally, in the five years prior to the sale, GMAC paid GM over $8 billion in much-needed 
cash dividends 
 
While the $7.4 billion in proceeds from the sale to Cerberus was clearly helpful in improving GM’s cash 
balance to a relatively healthy $30 billion as it approached a major cash-draining restructuring in 2007-09, liquidity 
needs do not appear to have been the overriding motivation for the sale. We argue below that a number of beneath-
the-surface factors were much more critical in the decision to sell a majority stake in GMAC. 
 
Cleaning Up GM’s Balance Sheet 
 
While the sale of half of a subsidiary operation normally would not have a significant impact on the 
parent’s balance sheet, as Table 2 demonstrates, in this case the effect was quite dramatic: 
 
 
Table 2:  General Motors Condensed Balance Sheet (Before and After GMAC Sale) 
(dollars in billions) 9/30/2006 12/31/2006  9/30/2006 12/31/2006 
      
Cash    $  17.8    $  23.7 Current Liabilities $ 68.6 $ 67.8 
Other Current Assets        41.2    $  40.4 Long Term Liabilities  389.9  123.8 
Long-Term Assets      410.6      114.6    
Investment in GMAC   ______    ___7.5 Stockholder’s Equity    11.1     (5.4) 
Total Assets   $ 469.6   $ 186.2  $ 469.6   $ 186.2 
      
 
 
The November 30, 2006 sale of 51% of GMAC was just enough to trigger a switch from consolidation to 
the equity method of accounting, which effectively removed all the GMAC receivables and borrowings from GM’s 
books. While still highly-leveraged, GM now appeared as a “leaner, meaner” operation with improved liquidity and 
primed to undertake a major restructuring in 2007-08. In the six months following the sale, Standard & Poors 
removed GM from its “CreditWatch” list and upgraded their overall credit rating from B+ to BB-, which may have 
in part been due to its slimmed-down balance sheet.    
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Improving GMAC’s Credit Rating / Reducing Borrowing Costs 
 
     As a lender, it was imperative that GMAC maintain a low cost of borrowing and maximize the interest 
spread (the difference between the interest charged on loans and cost of debt) in order to remain competitive and 
generate profitability. As shown in Table 3, from 2002 to 2006 GMAC’s interest expense increased steadily, which 
caused its interest spread to deteriorate: 
 
 
Table 3:  GMAC Interest Revenue vs Interest Expense (2002-2006) 
(Dollars in Billions) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Gross Financing Revenue (including leases) $  16.4 $  18.7 $  20.3 $  21.3 $  23.1 
less: Depreciation on Leased Vehicles     (4.8)     (5.5)     (4.8)     (5.2)     (5.3) 
= Interest Revenues $ 11.6 $ 13.2 $ 15.5 $ 16.1 $  17.8 
Interest Expense      6.8      7.6      9.7    13.1     15.5 
Interest Spread in Dollars $   4.8 $   5.6 $   5.8 $   3.0 $    2.3 
Interest Expense / Interest Revenue    58.6%    57.6%    62.6%    81.3%     87.1% 
Average Interest Rate Spread      3.0%      2.8%      2.5%      1.2%       1.0% 
 
        
Not coincidentally, during this period the company experienced a series of negative credit rating changes 
from several agencies, which increased its cost of borrowing and caused the rapidly shrinking interest rate spread. 
Credit rating changes for 2003 to 2006 for GMAC as provided by Moody’s Credit Rating Service are shown Table 
4. 
 
Table 4:  GMAC Credit Rating Changes 
Date of Rating Rating Change 
June 2003 A2 to A3 
November 2004 A3 to Baa1 
April 2005 Baa1 to Baa2 
August 2005 Baa2 to Ba1 
 
 
       
The declining credit quality and increased borrowing costs at GMAC were largely attributable to its 
position as a wholly-owned subsidiary of GM, which was simultaneously being downgraded even more aggressively 
by the same agencies. As GMAC followed its parent into junk bond status, its interest costs began to rise sharply 
and its ability to compete effectively in the lending markets was threatened. Analysts were concerned that as 
GMAC’s credit quality deteriorated, it would only be able to write loans for buyers with the worst credit ratings, 
leaving it with a weak loan portfolio.  As Table 5 shows, compared to risk-free 5-year Treasury notes, GMAC’s 
weighted average cost of debt rose significantly from 2003 to 2006. 
 
 
Table 5:  GMAC Weighted Average Cost of Debt (2000-2006) 
  Weighted Average Risk 
Year 5 Yr T Note Cost of Debt Premium 
2000 6.16% 6.42% 0.26% 
2001 4.56% 5.50% 0.94% 
2002 3.82% 4.32% 0.50% 
2003 2.97% 3.64% 0.67% 
2004 3.43% 4.31% 0.88% 
2005 4.05% 5.10% 1.05% 
2006 4.75% 5.88% 1.13% 
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The increase of 63 basis points in the risk premium over the 2002-06 period cost GMAC an estimated $1.8 
billion of additional annual interest costs, which in turn led them to develop a number of strategies to counteract 
their inability to issue debt at favorable interest rates: 
 
 In an effort to lower the firm’s cost of capital, GMAC bundled auto loans and used them as collateral for 
bond issues, as opposed to raising money by unsecured debt offerings.   In 2001, these asset-backed 
securities comprised 21% of GMAC’s new debt financing, but by 2004 it was almost 38%. Because of the 
predictability of auto-loan cash flows, asset securitizations carry lower risk premiums than more traditional 
forms of financing, but they don’t represent a permanent solution. Per Sanjiv Khattri, CFO, of GMAC 
“Eventually, you need some unsecured debt to finance your business.”1   
 From 2003 to 2006 the total loan portfolio on GMAC’s balance sheet only grew 2.3%, while the large 
volume of loans that they originated, sold, but continued to service rose 46.0%. This suggests a plan to sell 
off a larger portion of their newly-originated loans to investors with presumably lower costs of capital.  
 Through ResCap, GMAC dramatically increased their high-risk lending operations, where the higher 
interest rates charged on loans would better offset their higher cost of debt capital. From 2003 to 2006 
subprime, second mortgage, and non-conforming loans increased from 50.3% to 73.3% of their lending 
portfolio. 
 GMAC attempted to build up their insurance and loan-servicing business in order to produce revenues that 
were independent of credit ratings and interest rates. Aided by a strong stock market, from 2003 to 2006 the 
insurance operation went from producing 6.4% of the company’s operating profit to 37.4%, while the loan-
servicing portfolio grew by 46% over the same period. While still known as a lender, by 2006 GMAC had 
made significant strides toward diversification as a financial services provider.  
 The ultimate strategy was to split off GMAC from GM to try to restore its investment grade debt rating and 
better position the company for future growth. A sale of a majority stake in the operation would provide 
board governance independent of GM, and it was anticipated that such independence would hopefully 
provide improved funding at lower rates, increased capital for expansion, and access to any special 
expertise possessed by an acquiring firm. In late 2005, Standard & Poor’s volunteered that “…the potential 
for [debt] downgrades of the finance unit and its related operations… stem solely from the deteriorating 
rating outlook at GM. The potential for upgrades depends on these entities achieving substantial separation 
from their parent, [which] now seems to be more likely to occur.”2  When the idea of a partial sale was 
proposed, GMAC’s Khattri reasoned “It is better to be the partial owner of a growing organization that has 
competitive access to funding, than to be full owner of an organization whose funding might be 
constrained.”3 The firm’s inability to borrow at competitive rates was making it almost impossible for 
GMAC to win a fair share of new loan business from borrowers with a low to normal risk profile. 
Something had to be done before a sound business became a basket case. 
 
Unlocking GMAC’s Market Value   
 
Another major motivator for change was the May 2005 attempt to take over General Motors by Kirk 
Kerkorian’s Tracinda Corporation. John Casesa of Merrill Lynch saw it clearly: “There is no doubt in our mind that 
Tracinda’s interest is not in the auto business, but rather in unlocking value embedded in the noncore businesses.”4 
Since the most valuable and most easily separable noncore business was GMAC, sale of the financing unit began to 
be seen as a necessary strategy to unlock its market value and simultaneously make GM a less enticing target for 
corporate raiders, especially considering GM’s bargain price tag as the lowest valued stock among the Dow 
industrials.  
 
Just how much value was there to unlock? Based on the final sale price of $14 billion for a 51% stake, an 
independent GMAC appeared to be worth about $28 billion at November 30, 2006, or approximately 1.32 times the 
book value of its equity. Retroactive application of this same market-to-book ratio to prior years produced the 
estimated market capitalization shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6:  GMAC Estimated Market Capitalization (in billions) 2000-2006 
 9/30/00 9/30/01 9/30/02 9/30/03 9/30/04 9/30/05 9/30/06 
Assets $ 160.2 $ 180.4 $ 211.0 $ 275.8 $ 311.8 $ 314.2 $ 309.8 
Liabilities 146.7 165.4 193.5 255.6 289.0 291.4 288.7 
Equity 13.5 15.0 17.5 20.2 22.8 22.8 21.1 
Market to Book  Multiplier 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.32 
Estimated Market  Capitalization $  18.0 $  19.9 $  23.1 $  26.7 $  30.1 $  30.2 $  28.0 
 
 
For comparison, the market capitalization of GM as a whole (including GMAC) is shown in Table 7: 
 
 
Table 7:  GM Market Capitalization (in billions) 2000-2006 
 9/30/00 9/30/01 9/30/02 9/30/03 9/30/04 9/30/05 9/30/06 
GM Shares Outstanding   564.9 m 555.5 m 560.4 m 560.7 m 564.8 m 565.5 m 565.6 m 
Market Price Per Share $ 62.13 $ 41.72 $ 33.25 $ 42.67 $ 38.55 $ 27.40 $ 34.92 
Market Capitalization $ 35.1 $ 23.2 $ 18.6 $ 23.9 $ 21.8 $ 15.5 $ 19.7 
 
 
The graphical comparison of the market capitalization of GMAC independent of the GM consolidated 
entity shown in Figure 2 provides a very compelling reason for management to consider the sale of their most 
profitable business unit:   
 
 
 
 
 
By 2002 the estimated market value of GMAC began to exceed the market capitalization of the 
consolidated GM entity, thereby creating an enticing opportunity for an outside investor to mount a takeover bid and 
then sell GMAC alone for more than the purchase price. By 2005 the pressure for a transaction of some type was 
mounting, as GMAC’s market capitalization of $30 billion was almost exactly twice that of the consolidated GM 
entity. If GM didn’t act to monetize the unrecognized market value of GMAC, then an unfriendly suitor might. On 
Figure 2:  Market Capitalization (in billions)  
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the other hand, if GM sold off a portion of the financing unit, it would simplify GM’s balance sheet, increase its 
liquidity, improve GMAC’s access to low-cost debt financing, and unlock GMAC’s market value for the benefit of 
its own shareholders rather than for a corporate raider. Seen in this light, the partial sale of GMAC was not really a 
surprise, but more an inevitability.     
 
CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE 
 
GM’s initial divestiture strategy was build on strong foundations: the sale of 51% of GMAC to Cerberus 
afforded it a level of independence that would provide better access to funding, an improved credit rating and a 
correspondingly lower cost of borrowing; simultaneously, the deal would streamline GM’s balance sheet as well as 
allowing the monetization of a major asset that had long been undervalued in the financial markets.  GMAC CEO 
Eric Feldstein suggested that GMAC’s profits could double with a better credit rating and that GM would be better 
off with $14 billion cash and 49% of an improved GMAC than with 100% of the old operation. The sale of the 
majority interest presented opportunities for growth and expansion into new markets, as Cerebrus offered capital, 
resources, experienced management and industry expertise.  However, in the commercial world even the best-laid 
plans sometimes go astray, and the results of the divestiture have thus far been disappointing. 
 
Any hope that the sale to Cerberus would help market values was dashed by high oil prices and Toyota’s 
recent dethroning of General Motors as the world’s largest auto manufacturer. By early 2008 GM’s market 
capitalization had fallen to $9 billion, less than half of what it was before the GMAC transaction closed.  
 
However, the main culprit in GM’s foiled divestiture strategy has clearly been the recent sub-prime loan 
crisis, which had a devastating impact on the ResCap division of GMAC. In 2007 GMAC announced a provision for 
loan losses of $3.1 billion, which was three times the level reported in 2005.  As a result, GMAC reported a huge 
loss and GM had to book a loss of $1.25 billion on its remaining equity-method investment.   Not surprisingly, the 
hoped-for credit rating improvement did not happen; in May 2008 GMAC debt was rated B+ by Fitch and the 
ResCap division carried a separate S&P rating of CC, or just above default status.  By the end of 2007, GMAC’s 
average risk premium was 1.97%, resulting in an increased average borrowing cost of 84 basis points from the 
November 2006 sale. Freeing GMAC from GM was a theoretically a sound idea and would probably have been 
successful if GMAC had not had a millstone around its neck in the form of a huge subprime loan exposure at 
ResCap. 
 
What are the lessons to be learned from the GMAC sale? First, while you may love an operation and hate to 
part with it, you may have to sell it in order to save it. GMAC under GM control and with GM’s credit rating was no 
longer a viable business. Second, partial divestiture is messy and full of pitfalls, but it can be a sound strategy in a 
given set of circumstances; half of a fresh loaf is better all of a stale loaf. Finally, even a well thought out divestiture 
strategy can be ambushed by an event as tumultuous as the subprime loan crisis. 
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